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Abstract The purpose of this article is to present a frame of reference in which to
compare fisheries regulations and to identify enforcement issues that can be impor-
tant in practical policy application. The issues discussed include dockside vs. at-sea
monitoring; ease of government implementation; period at ristc when in noncompii-
ance; ease and cost with which industry participants can achieve ability to comply;
ease of distinction between honest mistakes, sloppy practices, and deliberate cheat-
ing; initial vs. continued compliance; ease with which requirements can be communi-
cated; ease with which noncompliance can be disguised; ease with which agents can
detect noncompliance such that it is admissable as evidence; degree to which per-
sonal or social benefits from compliance can be demonstrated; potential for citizen
cooperation in identifying offenders; likelihood of encouraging rentseeking behavior
by industry and of administrators being susceptible to it; ease with which illegal
activities can be detected under various conditions; relative ability to which enforce-
ment is efficacious with respect to different management objectives; and ease with
which benefit-based priorities for enforcement can be identified.
Keywords Fisheries enforcement, fisheries management, fisheries rent.
Introduction
The fisheries management literature contains many comparative studies of the relative
effectiveness of policy instruments such as taxes, quotas, input restrictions, etc. Most give
particular emphasis to achieving economic efficiency, narrowly defined. Little attention,
however, has been given to the relative ease of enforcement. (Enforcement includes moni-
toring activities to identify rule breakers and prosecution activities wherein guilt or inno-
cence is ascertained and penalties are assessed and implemented when guilt is proved.)
This is a serious deficiency. If there are practical constraints to enforcement, what may
appear to be the overall superior instrument may not achieve program activities.
The purpose of this article is to present a frame of reference in which to compare
policy instruments and to identify enforcement issues that can be important in practical
policy application. Furthermore, it compares standard policy instruments on their ability
to face problems caused by these enforcement issues. At the outset, however, it should
be noted that in this broader context, there are often no clear winners and losers. In fact,
in many cases, it is not possible to compare general classes such as standard versus
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taxes. The necessary comparison must be between certain types of standards and certain
types of taxes.
The new information provided in this article, when added to the existing literature,
will provide a framework for choosing the best instrument or instruments for different
situations, each with its own economic, biological, and political peculiarities. In certain
situations, this more complete framework may result in a different choice of manage-
ment programs than would be the case if enforcement issues were ignored.
The first section briefly reviews the problem of fisheries regulation when enforce-
ment issues are considered. The second section lists and describes in detail some of the
important enforcement issues and how they can affect various regulation programs.
Many of the issues may not be obvious to those who concentrate on the more traditional
aspects of fisheries policy.
Economic Efficiency and the Enforcement of Environmental
and Natural Resource Programs
The prime economic justification for fisheries regulation is market failure. Because of
externalities and/or open access to the relevant resource, the unregulated economy will
not maximize the value of goods and services produced. Economically optimal regula-
tion programs are based on the premise that they can reallocate inputs associated with
these processes so that the net present value of goods and services produced over time
will increase. There are many other criteria for evaluating management programs, but
only economic efficiency is discussed in this section.
Although the above may be an overly simple statement of the economic foundation
of fisheries policy, it does capture its essence. Most practitioners would stress, however,
that a regulation program cannot be justified unless the present value of gains is greater
than any implementation and enforcement costs. Until very recently, however, these
costs have been (explicitly or implicitly) treated as fixed annual amounts that are merely
subtracted from the gross gains. Recent work has shown, however, that less restrictive
assumptions about enforcement costs are required to obtain a complete analysis. (See,
for example. Downing and Watson 1974; Harford 1978; Hucke 1978; Downing and
Kimball 1980; Storey and McCabe 1980; Beavis and Walker 1981; Brady and Bower
1982; Downing and Kimball 1982; Krupnick, Magat, and Harrington 1982; Richardson
1982; Ullmann 1982; Lee 1984; Under and McBride 1984; Malik 1984; Martin 1984;
Sutinen and Andersen 1985; Tietenburg 1985; Anderson and Lee 1986; Milliman 1986;
Russell, Harrington, and Vaughn, 1986; Beavis and Dobbs 1987.) To set the stage for
the analysis to follow, it will prove useful to review some of this discussion.
The net gains from a fishery regulation program can be represented by the sche-
matic in Figure 1 in which all items are measured in present value terms. The important
point to note is that there are many types of enforcement-related costs, and these costs
will vary with the type of policy instrument and how it is used. That is, although the net
benefit of an unregulated fishery may be the difference between the value of the output
and the cost of fishing effort, the net benefits of a regulated fishery must take into
account all costs that follow as a direct result of the regulation program.
Compliance costs are those initial expenses borne by firms as they prepare to change
their behavior to come into compliance with regulations. With provisions such as gear
restrictions, this can involve the purchase of new gear or the adaptation of old. Taxes, on
the other hand, may require no capital expenditures per se but only the acquisition of the
appropriate forms and the knowledge of how to prepare them.Enforcement Issues in Fisheries Management Policy 263
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Figure 1. Net gains from regulated fishery.
Lobbying costs to amend regulations or obtain variances and litigation expenses to
get regulations overtumed or at least have their implementation delayed or to obtain
exemptions can also be classified as compliance costs. Rather than meet specified stan-
dards or behavioral patterns, the firm engages in rent-seeking behavior to get the rules
changed so that current operations will be in compliance (see Johnson and Libecap 1982;
Karpoff 1987).
Avoidance costs are the expenses firms may undertake to hide noncompliance or to
make it appear as if they are in compliance. For example, boats could have two sets of
nets on board if there are mesh size regulations, or boats could offload part of the catch
at out-of-the-way ports or to other vessels if there were trip limit regulations. Different
types of policies will provide different potentials to engage in these wasteful activities.
All else being equal, the ones which allow less avoidance waste are economically supe-
rior (see Anderson and Lee 1986; Milliman 1986).
Whereas the first two costs are imposed on regulated firms, the other two classifica-
tions are government expenses. Initial government implementation costs are the start-up
costs of getting the program operating. If the regulation is similar to other government
programs (i.e., quotas for a newly managed fishery when quotas are used in many other
fisheries) and existing organizations or agencies can perform the task, these costs could
range from little more than assigning tasks to existing staff to hiring and training new
personnel. If the regulation is radically different, however, these costs can be quite high
as new agencies or branches are established, personnel are hired, standard operating
procedures are established, etc.
Government enforcement costs include both monitoring and prosecution activities.
The purpose of the former is to encourage compliance and detect deviance. The latter
can range from administrative hearings to formal court proceedings and all the negotia-
tions, bargaining, and other transactions that accompany them (see Sutinen 1986; Was-
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While considering these extra costs, it is necessary to determine how each varies
with both the type of instrument and the level at which it is used. Although it is beyond
the scope of this article to present a formal model of this optimization process, suffi-
ciently precise policy conclusions for the analysis to follow can be derived from a rather
simple statement of the problem. For more detail, see Anderson and Lee (1986).
In the most general case, the problem for the management agency is to select the
appropriate combination of policy instruments and to allocate implementation and en-
forcement inputs so that the net gains from the regulated fishery are maximized. To solve
this problem, it is necessary to know how the types of instruments used and levels to
which they are applied and the inputs used to support their application will affect each of
the elements in the net gains equation. For example, how will the type and size of the
total quota or the nature and the extent of trip limits affect compliance costs or the
number of person-years of labor allocated to the various aspects of enforcement affect
avoidance costs?
At the risk of being redundant, it is important to emphasize that it is not a matter of
maximizing the net revenue from the fishery or of minimizing regulation costs. It is the
algebraic sum of all terms in the equation that is crucial. Furthermore, each term can be
affected by the types and extent of regulation. The value of fishery output will be
affected according to the efficacy of the regulation program in actually changing indus-
try participants' behavior (i.e., how much it will actually reduce effort in an overex-
tended fishery.) In addition, the quality of the marketable product may be affected for
good or ill. For example, a regulation plan which would increase the length of the
Pacific halibut season would allow for more fish to be sold fresh. On the other hand, in
other fisheries, a restrictive quota which can easily be circumvented by landing at out-of-
the-way ports and trucking the catch to central marketing areas may increase the average
time it takes to get the fish to the processor or the consumer and hence will likely result
in a decrease in quality.
The type of regulation can also affect the cost of producing effort. This has been the
focus of most of the economic analysis of policy instruments. The universal conclusion
is that traditional measures such as gear restrictions, closed seasons, closed areas, and
total quotas cause fishing effort to be produced at a higher cost than is necessary.
Furthermore, except for total quotas, such measures will not be completely efficacious
in the long run as industry participants modify their fixed an variable inputs to maximize
profits subject to the constraints posed by the regulations. On the other hand, controlled-
access-type regulations such as taxes, individual transferable quotas, and to some extent,
license restriction programs produce incentives for efficient production (see Rettig and
Ginter 1978; Pearse 1979; Sturgess and Meany 1982; Beddington and Rettig 1984;
Anderson 1987).
That the type of regulation program can affect avoidance and government imple-
mentation and enforcement costs should be obvious from the discussion above. It fol-
lows, therefore, that in order to provide a complete economic evaluation and comparison
of policy instruments, it is necessary to give more detail on how each will affect the six
elements in the net gains equation.
To carry the economic efficiency analysis one step further, the problem facing most
resource agencies is more than a simple maximization problem in which they optimally
choose policy instruments and allocate implementation and enforcement inputs. In the
first place, they seldom know the exact nature of the gains function to be maximized. In
the second place, there may be other (explicit or implicit) maximands (mostly dealing
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force behind agency operations. Incidentally, the agencies may be just as uncertain about
the true nature of these other maximands as they are about the net gains equation.
Finally, they are constrained by an operational budget. In reality, then, the agency faces
a constrained maximization problem in which there is a good deal of uncertainty about
the nature of the maximand.
Because of the constraint, the economic efficiency effects of the allocation of agency
inputs is just that much more critical. Therefore, the relative as well as the absolute
effects of the various instruments on items in the net gains equation will be of interest.
Furthermore, the budget allocation problem is made more difficult because it is not just a
matter of knowing how to allocate funds among different regulation inputs per se, but
also between regulation inputs as a group and research activity devoted to obtaining a
better picture of the bioloei"""', ecological, and economic aspects of the world in which
they operate. That is, they have to use scarce inputs to better define their maximand and
the institutional and ecological constraints under which they operate. In this regard,
comparison of policy instruments with respect to what is currently known or can be
known about their effects will be important.
Enforcement Issues in Selecting Policy Instruments
The purpose of this section is to introduce issues that can be of importance in selecting
fishery management regulations. In particular, the focus is on the effect each can have in
the determination of the size of the elements in the net gains equation depicted in Figure
1. The discussion of each issue is brief, but the goal is to explain exactly how the issue is
related to the direct or related costs or the effectiveness of regulation.
Dockside versus At-Sea Monitoring
Each monitoring type has different relative abilities to detect noncompliance with spe-
cific types of regulation, and, just as important, each has different relative costs. In
general, at-sea monitoring is more expensive, but it does offer the potential to observe
all aspects of the fishing operation. Although dockside monitoring is relatively less
expensive, it is also remote from the fishing activity. The key question is whether this
remoteness will frustrate the purpose of management by allowing activities to take place
between harvesting and landing which make it more difficult to determine if the fishing
operation was conducted in a legal manner. More formally, the question is whether the
loss in compliance benefits is greater than the cost savings from going from at-sea to
dockside enforcement.
The comparison of at-sea versus dockside enforcement is ambiguous in fisheries
management enforcement. First, there is obviously more than a simple trade-off between
cost and relative efficacy. For example, at a more technical level, there is the question of
what is the most important objective and the best way to enforce to achieve it. Consider
a fishery where both total catch limits and prohibitions on retaining small individuals
will provide benefits. Assume that the total limit is more productive in producing net
gains. Because it can be enforced at dockside, net gains may be maximized by regulating
the catch of young fish in a way that can also be enforced dockside. For example, in this
hypothetical case, mesh size restrictions might be better, in an overall sense, than inci-
dental catch restrictions, even though the latter may have an absolute advantage in
reducing mortality of small fish (/"enforced with an effect at-sea monitoring program.
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tal catch limit, the marginal cost of enforcing it in combination with the dockside moni-
toring of total catch may be so much lower than enforcing the incidental catch limit at
sea that the overatl net benefits of the mesh size restrictions will be much higher. All etse
being equal, then, cost reductions may be possible by selecting combinations of regula-
tions such that only one monitoring mode is required, even if some of the governing
instruments chosen are second best in an absolute sense (Pallozzi and Springer 1985).
Another problem with the at-sea/dockside controversy is that an optimal manage-
ment program may produce distributional or biological effects that when viewed in
isolation appear suboptimal. For example, consider a fishery that requires restrictions on
the number of small fish taken. This can be accomplished by minimum mesh size limits
or by area restrictions if fish migrate over their life cycle or if the stock breaks into
patches of relatively old or young fish in various parts of the ocean at different times of
the year. However, because of the relatively high cost of enforcing at sea, it is possible
that a simple possession prohibition on small mesh nets or of small fish, which can be
enforced at dockside, may be the regulation that produce the highest net gains.
Possession restrictions on small mesh nets are not only enforceable dockside; they
may be the only practical way to assure compliance. If more than one mesh size were
allowed on board, at-sea monitoring would be required to ensure that the smaller mesh
nets are not used. And even with at-sea monitoring, it may not be possible to achieve
compliance if successful prosecution requires the boarding officer to find the illegal net
in the water (See detailed discussions below.)
Prohibitions on the possession of small fish do have serious drawbacks, however.
Although such restrictions would be easy to enforce on land and would encourage indi-
viduals to operate in areas or times when small fish are less frequently caught and to
shift locations if smatl fish are taken on the first set, they would require the dumping of
all small fish whether they are dead or alive when returned to the sea. In some instances,
the loss of this product may be less than the savings in enforcement costs as compared to
other types of regulation. However, complaints focusing exclusively on the discard of
small edible fish can make a fisheries agency look very bad.
Similarly, mesh size restrictions with prohibition on possession of small mesh nets
can cause distributional problems. Some boats may switch from fishery to fishery in the
course of a trip according to fish availability, relative prices, etc. Therefore, they will
desire to carry more than one set of nets (each legal for at least one fishery) in order to
operate as profitably as possible. Although a regulation that allows only one set of nets
on board may significantly reduce overall enforcement costs and indeed may be the only
way that is really enforceable, such a plant may significantly reduce net revenues for all
or part of the fleet. In essence, although the regulation costs to the government could
fall, there may be increases in regulation costs to the industry. An angry constituent
complaining to his or her legislator that a "silly bureaucratic law" requires the boat to
retum to shore and unload catch before changing nets is likely to find a sympathetic ear.
There are some distribution problems here. Dockside monitoring may increase total net
benefits by lowering government costs while at the same time lowering net revenue to the
fleet. There are ways to give industry incentives to support dockside enforcement if it is
appropriate, however. For example, as part of its controlled access program in which fisher-
men are given quasi-property rights in the fisheries, Australia has instituted a user-pays
system in which the owners must pay a levy to cover some of the operational costs of
enforcement. This levy is currently around 38% of the assessed enforcement costs, and there
are plans to increase it to 50%. Under this system, industry pressure for supplementary
regulations which must be enforced at sea have significantly declined (Lilbum 1986, 155).Enforcement Issues in Fisheries Management Policy 267
Another point in favor of dockside monitoring is that considerable leeway is granted
to it under current law. If used effectively with appropriate regulations, this flexibility
could make dockside monitoring a very powerful monitoring mode. For example, sect.
1857(1)(G) of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA)
makes it illegal to "ship, transport, offer for sale, sell, purchase, import, export, or have
custody, control, or possession of, any fish taken or retained in violation of this Act" or
its implementing regulations, permits, or Governing International Fishing Agreements.
The same section imposes strict liability on fish processors or merchants in that viola-
tions do not require elements of willfulness, intent, or even knowledge (Jacobson, Con-
nor, and Tozer 1987, 112). Sting operations on distributors could seriously damage the
market for illegal fish and hence the incentive for harvesters to ignore fishing restric-
tions.
Ease of Government Implementation
The ease with which a regulation can be implemented has a direct bearing on enforce-
ment and monitoring costs and hence on net benefit of management. There are two
separate points here. The first is the legality of various types of regulations. Obviously,
if certain types are forbidden by legislation or precluded by constitutional guarantees,
they will not be enforceable. However, constitutionality is often not determined until
after legal challenge. For example, state fisheries laws which prohibited or unduly re-
stricted residents of other states from fishing were declared unconstitutional on the basis
of equal protection under the law.
The issue is more complicated, however. In addition to the legality of the regulation,
there must also be suitable procedures to enforce it. As an extreme example, although
there is a per vessel quota in the Nova Scotia herring fishery, there is no regulation
stating that the fishermen must weigh the fish they sell. Therefore, they cannot be
charged with misreporting their catch because they can declare ignorance of the exact
amount landed (Peacock and MacFarlane 1986, 226).
Furthermore, authority over fisheries is often vested in many jurisdictions, includ-
ing the various states and the management councils. What is permitted in one state may
be illegal in another. At worst, this can cause interjurisdictional conflicts, and at best, it
can cause time-wasting delays in cooperative management as individual states pass con-
forming legislation. This has been a serious problem in enforcing the Common Fisheries
Policy of the EEC; the overall agreement included some stipulations that were forbidden
under the laws of some of the member countries. Those countries could not enforce the
rules until the domestic laws were changed, and when the others saw this, they were
hesitant about enforcing them if it would disadvantage their citizens (EEC 1986).
Besides legality, ease of implementation also depends upon how enforcement will
merge with the existing institutional structure. As discussed above, the more a new
program differs from existing rules, the more difficult and more costly it will be to
implement it. In this regard, traditional regulations such as total quotas, gear restric-
tions, and closed area or seasons (programs which cause inefficiency in the production
of effort) will be easier and less costly to implement, at least on the margin. On the other
hand, an individual transferable quota program (the management device that seems best
able to encourage efficiency) will be quite expensive to set up. There will be the cost of
determining the initial distribution of the quotas. Because of legal constraints, it will be
necessary to set up an appeal procedure for those participants who feel they were treated
unfairly. Experience has shown that because of the high potential rewards, a large pro-268 L. G. Anderson
portion of those who are potentially eligible will appeal, either to get a quota or to
increase their share (Lowman 1986). There is also the cost of instituting a control
mechanism to keep track of ownership and transfers of quota shares and of matching an
individual's catch with his or her purchased or rented quota for a given period. The high
implementation costs, however, can be moderated by low continuing enforcement costs.
New Zealand, for example, expects that the present value of the reduction of all at-sea
monitoring and much of the dockside efforts that were required with more traditional
management will more than compensate for the high initial implementation costs of their
individual transferable quota (ITQ) system (Carouthers 1987).
Period at Risk When in Noncompliance
The issue here is the length of time the regulatee is at risk of being identified as being not
in compliance. Obviously, the longer the period, the more effective the regulation will
be. In fisheries, area closures are at one extreme. The fisherman is at risk only during
the period in which he or she is in the closed area. In most cases, once a fish is landed, it
is impossible to determine where it was caught. The other extreme would be an individ-
ual transferable quota program, in which a specified annual catch limit is given to
specific individuals or firms. In the first instance, the boat could make a dash into a
closed area when fishing is expected to be extremely productive and would be safe again
when it returned to an open area. On the other hand, if total catch records can be cross-
checked with dock agent reports or, better yet, with company income tax forms, devi-
ance from the annual individual limit could be detected as long as the records remain
unaltered and available.
Other regulations fall in between. Gear restrictions such as mesh size limits have a
very short period of risk, because the vessel must be caught with the net in the water.
Prohibitions on possession of certain types of fish have medium periods of risk, because
infractions can be detected from the time of harvest to at least the time of discharge and
sometimes longer if adequate paper trails on the transfer of sale through the markets are
available. For example, the harvesters of so-called short lobsters are often identified by
tracing back from where illegals are found on the market. Possession prohibitions on
gear can have a period of risk ofthe length ofthe trip for short-term capital, such as type
of net, to years for long-term capital, such as engine horsepower or vessel displacement.
Ease and Cost of Compliance
Compliance costs include the costs of installing and using legal gear, less of revenue due
to prohibited activities, and increases in business administrative costs. There are at least
two separate points to be considered in industry compliance. First, if compliance re-
quires a significant change in operating behavior, the costs in terms of obtaining the
requisite capital equipment or acquiring the human capital can be very high. Obviously,
the higher the compliance cost, the lower will be the net benefits of the regulated fishery,
even when there is complete acceptance of the program. At the same time, however,
higher costs will also encourage deliberate noncompliance or avoidance activities to
conceal noncompliance. Although avoidance activities will decrease industry compliance
costs, they will result in an even lower net present value of benefits from the regulated
fishery because of the excess pressure on the stocks.
A separate point is the speed with which the required changes can reasonably be
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one can make a reasonable argument that it takes a long time to obtain the physical or
human capital to comply easily on a day-to-day basis, detections of unlawful behavior
may prove of little use. The firm can persuade the court or the administrative law judge
that all reasonable steps have been taken to come into compliance, but full adherence to
the regulation will simply take time.
At the surface it may appear simple to address compliance cost problems: All else
being equal, choose that procedure which has the lowest cost of industry compliance.
However, all else is not always equal. Not only are there other efficacy and efficiency
effects associated with each regulation, but the same regulation will often affect hetero-
geneous industry participants differently. Therefore, it can be quite difficult to select the
one with the lowest overall compliance costs. The measurement of compliance costs and
the selection process will be made more difficult because each segment of the industry
will propose regulations that put the brunt of costs on their competitors.
Most fisheries regulations have compliance costs, but it is difficult to make any
general rankings. Gear restrictions obviously have costs, but their size depends upon the
exact type of restriction, and the divergence between it and the normal operating mode.
Closed seasons and closed areas can have compliance costs if fishing in other areas or
seasons is permitted and economically rational (the firm has the choice to cease fishing),
and it is more expensive to operate under the restrictions. Likewise, possession limits
can have higher costs due to sorting and to search costs to locate appropriate sized fish.
The compliance costs of ITQs will be mostly transaction costs. It will be necessary
to work with the agencies responsible for issuing, maintaining, and transferring the
quotas, and there may be added costs of landing the fish so that the catch can be checked
against a quota. There will also be the transaction costs of buying, selling, renting, or
leasing of ITQs so that the full economic efficiencies of the program can be achieved.
Although these costs may be quite high initially, it is likely they will decrease as formal
and informal networks are developed.
The purchase of ITQs from the government or other participants is a transfer pay-
ment and not a compliance cost in a social sense. However, from the private perspective
of an individual operator, they will be considered as such, and the market price of ITQs
will be a factor in the decision to comply with the program. This statement should be
interpreted with care, however. A high-value fishery will have high ITQ prices, but
there will be incentives to cheat when the returns are high no matter what type of
regulation is used.
Ease of Distinction between Honest Mistakes, Sloppy Practices,
and Deliberate Cheating
To use an example, the problem here is to differentiate between fishermen who do not
comply with, say, size restrictions, because (1) they had difficulty ascertaining average
individual size given the total amount of fish landed, the available measuring equipment,
and the ease of working it on an open deck in rough seas; (2) the catch was undersized
because of inadequate training or supervision of workers or because they simply failed to
do their jobs on a given day; or (3) the boat deliberately fished for small individuals or at
least failed to discard that part of the catch that was known to be illegal. When it is
difficult to distinguish between actions, it is difficult to know what to do on a case-by-
case basis. Accordingly, firms will attempt to have their actions judged as honest mis-
takes or, at worst, one-time, unintentional errors.
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ramifications. The issue of equal treatment of the second and third types is similar but
not so clear-cut. The problems can be reduced by having the severity of the penalty
depend upon the number of previous or smaller violations. This must be done with care,
however, because if the initial penalty is too low, the first violation may be viewed as a
freebie, and everyone will be encouraged to take it.
Long-term economic efficiency may require enforcement agencies, initially at least,
to work with firms which have the first two types of problems to help the come into
compliance. Qn the other hand, immediate and sure punitive actions which cause ex-
pected penalties that are greater than gains from cheating are necessary to eliminate the
third type of behavior.
It is difficult to rank regulation types as to how they handle this issue, but some
tentative conclusions are possible. After the initial communication of the required proce-
dures has occurred, it is fairly easy to distinguish deliberate cheaters on quotas (both
ITQs and total quotas) and closed seasons. These appear to be fairly black and white
issues. Qnce the total quota is capture, or if you do not have an ITQ, you should not be
fishing. Similarly, fishing during the closed season cannot be called a mistake. Area
closures are fairly straightforward, especially if an individual is caught in the middle of a
100-square-mile closed area with all his or her navigational equipment working. The
issue is not so clear-cut when the areas are small or the individual is caught only slightly
over the border. The seriousness of the last problem can sometimes be reduced by
instituting buffer zones around the actual area meant to be closed. Gear restrictions can
be troublesome unless they are simple prohibitions or otherwise unambiguous. Posses-
sion restrictions by species or size are straightforward, at least as long as the fish remain
in round form. However, when there is a mixed catch, it can sometimes be difficult for
the fisherman to sort out the catch and land only permitted individuals.
Initial versus Continued Compliance
This is a particularly important issue in pollution control because regulation almost
always involves a change in operating procedures, requiring new or modified capital
equipment. Therefore, a program cannot be successful unless firms come into initial
compliance by obtaining the appropriate equipment. Although it is relatively easy to
detect initial compliance, having the equipment is not always enough to guarantee a
reduction in effiuent. In most instances, proper maintenance and operation of the pollu-
tion control equipment is also required. Nonetheless, the relatively low cost of initial
compliance monitoring and the increased probability of continued compliance it pro-
duces normally makes it highly productive.
This is an important issue for gear restriction fisheries regulations as well because
initial compliance often corresponds to the procurement of a piece of capital equipment.
However, with regulations such as fishery-wide total quotas and area closures, the dis-
tinction between initial and continued compliance is not so clear. Therefore, with most
fisheries regulations, there is no analogous one-time check on initial compliance. Except
for permanent gear restrictions and perhaps some safety devices, fisheries enforcement
will have to be continuous to be effective.
In those cases in which the distinction does apply, say, a limit on length, horse-
power, or displacement, monitoring costs will be quite low. However, effectiveness of
these types of limits may leave something to be desired. Due to other margins that
operators can use to increase effort, these limits place an elastic control on effort and
cause effort to be produced inefficiently.Enforcement Issues tn Fisheries Management Policy 271
Ease of Communicating Requirements
Obviously, individuals cannot conform to regulations, even if they desire to cooperate, if
they cannot understand exactly what is expected of them. There are at least two parts to
this problem. First there is the simplicity or complexity of the regulation. A simple
prohibition of a particular type of gear is quite easy to understand. But with prohibitions
on harvesting certain species in certain areas with certain gear types which change over
the course of the year (as was the case in the first cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder
plan prepared by the New England Fishery Management Council in 1977), it is very
difficult to know what is permissible at any point in time.
Second, there is the language or framework that is used in posing the requirements.
It is important to use generally recognized measurement and analytic methods. For
example, if there is to be a trip limit, it should be defined in the way the particular
fishery measures its output. For example, surf clams are measured in cages, groundfish
in pounds, and salmon by the number of fish.
The way monitoring is performed can reduce these problems if the agents view part
of their role as showing industry participants exactly what the rules mean in terms of
their everyday behavior and how they can change their operations to come into compli-
ance. Overall management costs can be reduced if the agents can produce the ability as
well as the motivation to conform (Wasserman, n.d.).
Ease of Disguising Noncompliance
This issue is self-explanatory, but there are some subtle distinctions that should be illu-
minated. By use of detection-avoidance activities, fishermen are able to appear to be in
compliance. These activities can be anything from underreporting to subterfuges such as
fishing or landing fish at night or the use of remote ports or fishing grounds. If the
avoidance activities are costless (i.e., 150 pounds offish are put in a standard box when
the rule of thumb used by enforcement officers to measure total catch is 125 pounds per
box), then the problem is only one-dimensional. Noncompliance will cause total catch to
be higher than the desired amount. However, if avoidance activities use real inputs (i.e.,
carrying two sets of nets or landing fish in secondary ports), then the problem is two-
dimensional. Management objectives will not be achieved, and in addition, extra eco-
nomic resources will be drawn into the fishery, lowering the net economic gains.
If avoidance costs are low, noncompliance will normally be quite high because the
gains from cheating will be higher than the costs. Cheating will be encouraged if the
individual can see little private gain from compliance and if others are not complying
either. However, when avoidance costs are relatively high, the amount of noncompliance
will decrease.
Accordingly, when studying the possibility of deliberate avoidance that is likely to
accompany any particular regulation, both the types and the costs of possible avoidance
activities and the potential gains from noncompliance must be considered. In high-value
fisheries, incentives for avoidance will be there, and unless the regulatory program can
be designed accordingly, one or both dimensions of this problem may result.
Ease of Detecting Noncompliance That Is Admissible as Evidence
The key to this issue is the last few words. Detecting noncompliance in such a way that
the agent is very sure it exists is one thing, but obtaining evidence that will stand up in272 L. G. Anderson
court is quite difficult. As Perry Mason would say: "Does the preponderance of evi-
dence show that the individual is in noncompliance?"
There are at least three points here. One has to do with the nature of the regulation.
For example, it is not as easy to obtain admissible evidence on prohibitions ofthe use of
small mesh nets as it is on prohibitions on the possession of a small mesh net. From the
time a Coast Guard boat is spotted on the horizon until it can board a fishing vessel,
there is often plenty of time to switch from a small-mesh net to a large-mesh net. Unless
the boarding team can fmd the small-mesh net in the water, evidence of use is problem-
atic. Even if the small-mesh net is found to be wet and to contain fish, it may be possible
to argue that sea spray or rain got it wet and that fish from the large-mesh net fell into it.
On the other hand, if small-mesh nets are prohibited, it is fairly easy to establish that a
small-mesh net is on board.
A second point is the ease with which agents can be trained to obtain appropriate
evidence. The technical issues discussed in the previous paragraph may require some
legal training as to what types of evidence are formally admissible, but that is not the
real point. When the regulations are in terms of the permitted average number of indi-
viduals per pound of product landed for a several-thousand-pound catch, as it is with the
scallop fishery, there can be some very difficult technical and statistical measurement
problems (see Russell, Harrington, and Vaughn 1986). If it is very difficult to train
individuals to draw their samples correctly and to use the equipment and also to retain
their services once they are competent, then enforcement costs will be high and enforce-
ment efficacy will vary over time.
Finally, it is easier to obtain convincing evidence if scarce monitoring resources can
be focused on those individuals who are more inclined to noncompliance. Therefore,
those regulations which have an easy trigger to identify cheaters, even if that particular
information will not stand up in court, can be relatively more effective, because monitor-
ing resources can be used more carefully.
Demonstrating Personal or Social Benefits
from Compliance
The private decision to comply with a regulation is very complicated. Certainly the
relative private benefits and costs of compliance play a part. But in addition, the individ-
ual's view of himself as part of a society and the responsibility that such membership
entails is also important. Therefore, the more that fishermen can see individual benefits
from the program in general and from their cooperation in particular, the more likely it
is that they will comply. Along the same line, programs which are perceived as provid-
ing benefits to the fishery as a unit, or perhaps even for the society as a whole, will be
easier to enforce on those individuals who consider these things to be important.
Regulation is required in the first place because private actions lead to nonoptimal
social results. It therefore follows that private compliance with a properly formulated
control program will also involve net costs. Nonetheless, the higher the perceived bene-
fits, the higher will be the compliance rate. Or to look at it the other way around, some
individuals will suffer no guilt pains for noncompliance with a program that has no
perceived benefits to anyone.
In some ways this argument is compounding. For example, regulations which are
thought to be unenforceable will likely be viewed as producing no benefits; therefore the
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Potential for Citizen Cooperation in Identifying Offenders
The degree to which participants or others are willing and able to provide information on
the noncompliance of others (with or without a reward) will obviously lower monitoring
costs which should increase overall net benefits. Programs to encourage such behavior
are used in freshwater recreational fisheries. In some states there are signs near streams
listing open and closed seasons and encouraging people to call a hotline number if they
see illegal fishing. Similar programs might work in some commercial fisheries.
The motivation to help monitor is obviously important. This is partly related to the
personal benefits participants or the general public expect to obtain from successful
program operation. In commercial fishing, such gains are possible if two or more user
groups are competing for a stock and informing on rival groups will improve the relative
position of one's own group.
The ability to identify offenders is also important, and the ease with which this can
be done is related to the nature ofthe regulation. Casual observers will be able to discern
noncompliance with area and seasonal closures much easier than with gear restriction or
catch limits.
Encouraging Rent-Seeking Behavior
The more that individual participants feel that pressure applied on the management
agency will yield favorable results, the more they will engage in such rent-seeking
behavior. Although rent seeking can sometimes provide at least temporary gains for
private individuals, it produces net losses at a social level. There is an extensive litera-
ture on rent seeking with respect to government operations in general, but the logic
applies to fisheries management as well (see Bhagwati 1982; Buchanan, Tollison, and
Tullock 1980). Management institutions that directly or indirectly encourage industry
input will motivate resource waste because all industry participants will be inclined to
participate in such activities in order to remain competitive.
There is a delicate balance here, however. Industry can often provide information
that is extremely useful to the management process. But at the same time, it is not hard
to find examples where industry participation must be viewed as lobbying rather than as
a public service. Those management institutions that are most sheltered from industry
pressure will not encourage wasteful behavior, but at the same time, they may miss the
opportunity to obtain important management information at low costs.
Although the type of management institution is important in determining the amount
of rent-seeking activity, the type of regulation can also be a factor. For example, gear
restrictions and closed areas seem to invite specific lobbying because they normally hurt
various sectors of the fleet differently. Individual interests will be highly motivated to get
an exclusion for their gear type or what amounts to the same thing, a more restrictive
control on the gear type of their competitors. Petitions to change the boundary lines for
closed areas by a few degrees of latitude or longitude for much the same purposes are
also common occurrences. Not only do these actions slow up the implementation of
management, the loopholes provided can strongly affect the potential for gains. Also, the
higher the number of variances to a specific ordinance, the harder it is to communicate
the rules to industry and the more difficult it is to monitor.274 L. G. Anderson
Detection of Illegal Activities under Various Conditions
Compliance with most regulations will likely vary across time, space, type of vessel or
gear, species sought, etc. because the gains and losses of obeying the rules can critically
depend on such operational parameters. For example, the susceptibility of fish to certain
gear types may vary throughout the year, and so cheating may be more profitable in
January than it is in July. Likewise, the stock may be exploited by two different types of
gear of different groups, each of which has its own enforcement problems.
It is important, therefore, that the ability to enforce be flexible enough to be able to
handle the various situations that are likely to prevail. More important, of course, is the
ability to be able to work at those particular times when the motivation for noncompli-
ance is relatively strong and when noncompliance can have the most deleterious effects
on the objectives of management. For example, Zavolta, Strand, and Swartz (1987)
found that 5% of fishermen accounted for the great majority of the commercial striped
bass harvest in Chesapeake Bay. To be effective, a regulation program will have to be
enforceable on individuals even if the other 95% are not affected.
Efficacy of Enforcement with Respect to Management Objectives
While economic efficiency is obviously an important management objective by which to
compare different types of regulations, it is seldom, if ever, of most concern to real-
world decisionmakers, who more often focus on employment and distribution of income.
In some instances, although it may be difficult to enforce a certain type of regulation so
that one type of goal is achieved, obtaining sufficient compliance for another goal may
be relatively easy. Therefore, rating regulation types is not possible unless the full range
of management objectives is considered.
Identification of Benefit-Based Priorities for Enforcement
Although a management program may prohibit several activities, the net benefits of
perfect enforcement of each part may not be the same. For example, with fast-growing
cohorts, gear restrictions will provide more protection to small fish earlier in the season.
Therefore, the gains in terms of increased value of fisheries output from enforcement of
gear restrictions will vary throughout the season. Because enforcement resources are
always scarce, information on when and where to enforce can be quite valuable. There-
fore, it is important to be able to identify not only the change in behavior that is likely to
result from varying degrees of enforcement but also the net gains the changes in behav-
ior will produce. The need for govemment to be able to identify these differences is
obvious, but it is also important for industry to see them so that the rationale behind what
may otherwise appear as a random enforcement can be understood. Without this under-
standing, a lack of respect for the management program could develop which could
seriously reduce the net benefits of management.
Summary
Although this has been a detailed discussion, it can be summarized quite succinctly.
When comparing fisheries regulation programs, it is necessary to go beyond the effi-
ciency effects on the production of effort. The absolute and relative effects on industry
compliance and avoidance costs as well as government implementation and enforcementEnforcement Issues in Fisheries Management Policy 275
costs can also by very important in determining which program produces the largest net
benefits.
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